Scientist commercialization as conduit of knowledge spillovers by David B. Audretsch & T. Taylor Aldridge
Ann Reg Sci (2009) 43:897–905
DOI 10.1007/s00168-009-0297-4
SPECIAL ISSUE PAPER
Scientist commercialization as conduit of knowledge
spillovers
David B. Audretsch · T. Taylor Aldridge
Received: 16 June 2008 / Accepted: 3 March 2009 / Published online: 8 April 2009
© Springer-Verlag 2009
Abstract This paper examines how institutional, locational and individual charac-
teristics of university scientists influence patent inventions. The paper illustrates why
and how some scientists combine scientific and commercial creativity in the context
of their regional location and the particular type of institution where the scientist is
employed. Using a dataset of 1,683 individual scientists, over a 7-year period, the
paper estimates the impact of their patenting propensity. The paper uses the Carnegie
Classification of Universities, location and scientists human capital and applies a logit
analysis is to determine which aspects affect a scientist’s propensity to patent.
JEL Classification L26
1 Introduction
In his path breaking book, The Rise of the Creative Class, Florida (2002) identifies
three types of creativity—artistic creativity, scientific creativity, and entrepreneurial
creativity. This paper focuses on the intersection of two of these types of creativ-
ity—scientific and entrepreneurial—and examines the extent to which they can occur
within the same analytical unit of observation, in this case the scientist. Thus, this
paper examines the extent to which scientists are able to combine scientific creativity
with entrepreneurial creativity.
Why and will scientists decide to combine their scientific creativity with commer-
cial creativity? The answers to this question are important to institutions and scientists
engaged in research. The New Endogenous Growth models and theories highlight
the central role that investments in science and research play in generating economic
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growth (Romer 1986; Lucas 1993). But more recently, public policy makers, ranging
from local communities, to states and even entire countries have pointed out that such
investments in knowledge and research do not automatically spill over into commer-
cialized new products and innovations. Rather, what Acs et al. (2009) and Audretsch
et al. (2005) term as the knowledge filter effectively impedes the spillover and com-
mercialization of investments in knowledge, thereby limiting the rate of employment
creation and economic growth returns accruing from public and private investments in
science and research. In the presence of a high knowledge filter, investments in science
and research do not automatically spill over and become commercialized, resulting in
vigorous rates of economic growth and employment generation, as assumed in models
of endogenous growth. The combination of high investments in science and research
but low rates of economic growth and employment generation led first to what was
termed as the Swedish Paradox and somewhat later adapted by European Commis-
sion as The European Paradox. Audretsch et al. (2005) and Acs et al. (2009) identify
activities that involve the commercialization of science and research as the Missing
Link in the process of economic growth. In the absence of scientist commercialization
of research, investments in science and research will not generate an adequate rate
economic growth and job creation returns.
The purpose of this study is to understand why some scientists choose to combine
commercialization creativity with scientific creativity while others do not. We do this
by analyzing the propensity of scientists funded by grants from the National Can-
cer Institute (NCI) to commercialize their research. The results of this study suggest
that scientists receiving NCI funding have a high propensity to commercialize their
research. However, both characteristics specific to the scientist, such as her human
capital and reputation as well as institutional and environmental factors, such as the
regional and university context within which she works influence the propensity for a
scientist to commercialize her research.
2 Combining scientific and entrepreneurial creativity
Why will a scientist choose to combine her scientific creativity with entrepreneurial
creativity? A number of theories and hypotheses have posited why some scientists
choose to commercialize research while others do not, and some compelling insights
have been garnered through previous empirical studies. These include the scientist
life-cycle, which highlights the role of reputation, the knowledge production function,
which highlights the role of scientific human capital and resources, and the regional
and university contexts, which highlight the role of geographically bounded spillovers
and institutional incentives.
A large literature has emerged focusing on what has become known as the appro-
priability problem. The underlying issue revolves around how firms which invest in
the creation of new knowledge can best appropriate the economic returns from that
knowledge (Arrow 1962). Audretsch (1995) proposed shifting the unit of observation
away from exogenously assumed firms to individuals—agents with endowments of
new economic knowledge. When the lens is shifted away from the firm to the individ-
ual as the relevant unit of analysis, the appropriability issue remains, but the question
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becomes: “How can scientists with a given endowment of new knowledge best appro-
priate the returns from that knowledge?” Levin and Stephan (1991) suggest that the
answer is, it depends—it depends on both the career trajectory as well as the stage of
the life-cycle of the scientist.
The university or academic career trajectory encourages and rewards the production
of new scientific knowledge. Thus, the goal of the scientist in the university context
is to establish priority. This is done most efficiently through publication in scientific
journals (Audretsch and Stephan 2000). By contrast, with a career trajectory in the pri-
vate sector, scientists are rewarded for the production of new economic knowledge, or
knowledge which has been commercialized in the market, but not necessarily new sci-
entific knowledge per se. In fact, scientists working in industry are often discouraged
from sharing knowledge externally with the scientific community through publication.
As a result of these differential incentive structures, industrial and academic scientists
develop distinct career trajectories.
The appropriability question confronting academic scientists can be considered in
the context of the model of scientist human capital over the life-cycle. Scientist life-
cycle models suggest that early in their careers scientists invest heavily in human capital
in order to build a scientific reputation (Levin and Stephan 1991). In the later stages
of their career, the scientist trades or cashes in this reputation for economic return.
Thus, early in her career, the scientist invests in the creation of scientific knowledge in
order to establish a reputation that signals the value of that knowledge to the scientific
community.
With maturity, scientists seek ways to appropriate the economic value of the new
knowledge. Thus, academic scientists may seek to commercialize their scientific
research within a life-cycle context. The life-cycle model of the scientist implies that,
ceteris paribus, scientist reputation should play a role in the decision to commercialize.
An implication of the knowledge production function formalized by Griliches
(1979) is that those scientists with a greater research and scientific prowess have the
capacity for generating a greater scientific output. But how does scientific capability
translate into observable characteristics that can promote or impede commercialization
efforts? Because the commercialization of scientific research is particularly risky and
uncertain (Audretsch and Stephan 2000), a strong scientific reputation, as evidenced
through vigorous publication and formidable citations, provides a greatly valued sig-
nal of scientific credibility and capability to any anticipated commercialized venture
or project. This suggests a hypothesis, linking measures of the quality of the scientist,
or her scientific reputation as measured by citations and publications, to commercial-
ization.
Scientist location can influence the decision to commercialize for two reasons. First,
as Jaffe (1989), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Jaffe et al. (1993) and Glaeser et al.
(2002) show, knowledge tends to spill over within geographically bounded regions.
This implies that scientists working in regions with a high level of investments in new
knowledge can more easily access and generate new scientific ideas. This suggests that
scientists working in knowledge clusters should tend to be more productive than their
counterparts who are geographically isolated. As Glaeser et al. (1992, p. 1126) have
observed, “Intellectual breakthroughs must cross hallways and streets more easily than
oceans and continents.”
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A second component of externalities involves not the technological knowledge, but
rather behavioural knowledge. As Bercovitz and Feldman (2004) show for a study
based on the commercialization activities of scientists at Johns Hopkins and Duke
University, the likelihood of a scientist engaging in commercialization activity, which
is measured as disclosing an invention, is shaped based on the commercialization
behaviour of the doctoral supervisor in the institution where the scientist was trained,
as well as the commercialization behaviour and attitudes exhibited by the chair and
peers at the relevant department.
Thus, the locational and institutional contexts can influence the propensity for scien-
tists to engage in commercialization activities by providing access to spatially bounded
knowledge spillovers and by shaping the institutional setting and behavioural norms
and attitudes towards commercialization.
3 Measurement issues
The commercialization activity of university scientists was measured by starting with
those scientists that were awarded a research grant by the National Cancer Institute
between 1998 and 2002. Of those research grant awards, the largest 20 percent, which
included 1,693 scientist awardees, were taken to form the database used in this study.
The National Cancer Institute (NCI) awarded a total of $5,350,977,742 to the top
1,693 scientists in the United States from 1998 to 2002.
Because the focus of this paper is on the propensity for scientists to commercialize
their research, commercialization must be operationalized and measured. The most
common measure of commercialization of research is patents. Thus, the propensity
for NCI recipient scientists to patent was analyzed by obtaining patent data from the
United States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO). The patent database spans 1975–
2004. The inventor patent data included identification of the patent number of the
invention, the name and address of the inventor, and the inventor sequence number.
Figure 1 shows that the geographic distribution of patentees varied both across
regions as well as by gender. In some regions, such as New York, Mid-Atlantic, the
North West and Texas, the propensity for females to patent exceeded that of their male
colleagues. By contrast, in other regions, such as California, New England and the
Great Lakes, male scientists exhibited a greater propensity to patent.
Gender also clearly played a role in a number of other dimensions. For example,
Fig. 2 shows that the mean amount of the NCI grant was considerably greater for male
scientists who patented than for their female counterparts.
4 Estimation of a logit model
To shed light on the question, “Why do some scientists patent their scientific research
while others do not?” a logit model was estimated for the unit of observation of the
scientist identified in the NCI database where the dependent variable takes on the value
of one if she has patented over the time period 1998–2004 and zero if she did not.
The previous section suggests five different types of factors shaping the decision by
a scientist to commercialize her research—resources, personal characteristics, scien-
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Fig. 2 NCI Grant award by gender for patenting scientists
tific human capital, nature of the university, and location. These factors are empirically
operationalized through the following measures:
Award amount. This variable is the mean total NCI awarded to the scientist between
1998 and 2002. The award amount was obtained from the original NCI award excel
sheet. If external funding of scientific research is conducive to commercialization, a
positive coefficient of the Award Amount would be expected.
Male. This is a dummy variable assigned the value of one for males (1,310) of the
overall 1,693 included in the NCI database. The gender of each scientist was obtained
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by “Googling” their names. The estimated coefficient will reflect whether the gender
of the scientist influences the propensity to commercialize research.
Location. Ten different locational dummy variables were created taking on the value
of one for Texas, California, New York, Minnesota, Great Lakes (Ohio, Indiana, Illi-
nois, Michigan and Wisconsin), North West (Oregon and Washington), New England
(Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Massachusetts),
South Atlantic (Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Florida), Mid
Atlantic (Washington DC, Maryland, Pennsylvania), and other (Arizona, Alabama,
New Mexico, Colorado, Nebraska, Hawaii and Iowa.) Those regions which tend to
have greater investments in research and science, and also have developed a culture
more encouraging university and scientist commercialization, such as California and
New England, might be expected to have a positive coefficient.
5 University type
• Ivy League. A dummy variable was created taking on the value of one for all sci-
entists employed at Brown University, Cornell University, Columbia University,
Dartmouth College, Harvard University, Princeton University, the University of
Pennsylvania and Yale University.
• Public Universities. A dummy variable was created taking on the value of one for
scientists employed at public universities and zero otherwise. Because they are at
least partially financed by the public, state universities tend to have a stronger man-
date for outreach and commercialization of research. This may suggest a positive
coefficient.
• Carnegie classifications. The Carnegie Classification of Universities (2000 edi-
tion) provides a comprehensive study classifying universities by types of degree
offered. Each type of institution is defined according to the types and numbers of
degrees offered in different fields. The categories are
1. Special Medical Institution (graduate only that specializes in medical degrees
(i.e. doctors and nurses)
2. Research Intensive University (grants doctoral degrees in three fields and fewer
than 50 annually)
3. Research Extensive University (grants doctoral degrees in more than three
fields and more degrees than 50 annually)
4. Bachelors and Masters College (grants only BA/BS and masters degrees but
no Ph.D.s)
5. Associate’s College (2 year institution)
5.1 Scientist human capital
• Citations. A specific computer program was designed to measure the citations
of the 1,693 scientists through the “Expanded Science Citation Index.” A higher
number of citations reflect a higher level of human capital and scientific reputation
(Audretsch and Stephan 2000). A positive coefficient would reflect that the likeli-
hood of commercialization is greater for more productive scientists.
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Table 1 Logit results for scientist patents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.884 (6.33)** 0.896 (6.43)** 0.878 (6.27)** 0.878 (6.29)**
Medical University 0.248 (1.52) – 0.228 (1.16) –
Extensive University – 0.020 (0.14) – –
Intensive University −0.140(−0.63) – −0.171(−0.77) –
Star scientist 0.298 (1.75)* – – –
Citations – – 0.643 (2.97)** 0.644 (2.96)**
Papers published – −0.010(−0.05) – –
NCI total award 0.992 (0.951) −0.342(−0.02) −0.297(−0.18) −0.003(−0.19)
Public Institutions −0.182(−1.44) −0.202(−1.62) −0.164(−1.29) −0.209(−1.69)*
Ivy League 0.219 (1.13) 0.171 (0.89) 0.227 (1.16) –
Texas – 0.191 (0.438) −0.593(−2.01)** 0.259 (1.11)
North West −0.361(−1.29) −0.406(−1.48) −0.966(−3.32)** −0.283(−0.97)
California 0.597 (3.00)** 0.485 (2.80)** – 0.587 (2.97)**
New England 0.463 (0.048)** 0.375412 (1.73)* −0.153(−0.67) 0.526 (2.31)**
South 0.134 (0.64) – 0.472(−2.21)** 0.169 (0.78)
Mid Atlantic 0.090 (0.47) −0.137(−1.57) −0.504(−2.55)** 0.184 (0.94)
Great Lakes – – −0.666(−3.27)** –
Minnesota −0.659(−1.79)** −0.580(−1.57) −1.264(−3.23)∗∗ −0.510(−1.35)
New York −0.162(−0.70) −0.211(−0.95) −0.741(−3.14)** −0.062(−0.27)
Other −0.637(−3.03)** 0.033 (0.874)
Intercept −1.388(−6.41)∗∗ −1.286(−5.44)∗∗ −0.828(−3.97)** −1.432(−6.82)**
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.037 0.043 0.041
>Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sample size 1,683 1,683 1,683 1,683
t-Statistic in brackets
∗ Statistically significant at the two-tailed test for 90 percent level of confidence
∗∗ Statistically significant at the two-tailed test for 95 percent level of confidence
• Publications. A specific computer program was designed to measure the publi-
cations of the scientist, which should also reflect the level of human capital and
scientific reputation (Audretsch and Stephan 2000).
• Star scientist. A scientist is classified as being a star if she is in the top ten percent
of publications. A dummy variable was created taking on the value of one for
those scientists with a star classification and zero otherwise. Star scientists may be
able to attract resources for commercialization, suggesting a positive coefficient
(Audretsch and Stephan 1996).
The results from estimating the logit model using the patent measure for scientist
commercialization are provided in Table 1.
The various measures of scientist human capital, or scientist quality, are highly
correlated and therefore including them in the same estimated model may result in
multicollinearity. Thus, the first column presents results when the measure of star
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scientist is used, while the second column includes the measure of publications, and
the third and fourth column citations. As the positive and statistically significant coef-
ficient of star scientist suggests, those scientists with a prolific publication record tend
to have a higher propensity to commercialize research through patents. Similarly, those
scientists with greater citations also have a greater likelihood of filing for a patent.
There is also considerable statistical evidence suggesting that the gender of a scien-
tist influences the likelihood of commercialization in the form of patents. In particular,
being a male will elevate the propensity for a scientist to patent. The evidence concern-
ing the impact on university type on the patenting activities of scientists is weaker and
more ambiguous. There is at least some evidence suggesting that being employed in a
public university may actually reduce the likelihood of a scientist patenting. Finally,
the region in which the scientist is located apparently influences her propensity to
patent. In particular, those scientists located in California and New England exhibit a
greater likelihood of patenting, even after controlling for the other main factors, such
as scientist quality and gender.
6 Conclusions
Globalization has triggered a shift in the comparative advantage of leading devel-
oped countries away from the factor of capital and towards knowledge. For the fac-
tor of knowledge to be effective in generating employment, economic growth and
international competitiveness, it must spill over to become commercialized. As Acs
and Audretsch (2003) emphasize such knowledge spillovers are not automatic and
cannot be assumed to exist. Thus, in terms of Richard Florida’s insights about
creativity, investments in scientific creativity need to be combined with commercial
creativity to facilitate the spillover of such knowledge that can ultimately contrib-
ute to economic growth. Such scientific creativity can be combined with commercial
creativity by scientists who choose to commercialize their research.
This paper has identified why some scientists choose to combine scientific and
commercial creativity while others do not. In particular, the human capital and repu-
tation of the scientist play an important role, as does the context, in terms of regional
location and particular type of institution where the scientist is employed. The evi-
dence suggests that it is those scientists with the greatest amount of knowledge who
have a higher propensity to commercialize their research. However, such scientist
commercialization is conditioned by both the type of university as well as the region.
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